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Neofunctionalism: A Success Story? 
Mehmet Yilmazata* 
Abstract: Integration is one of the political catchphrases of the late 20th 
and the beginning of the 21st century. This paper will focus on the 
theoretical and practical role of neofunctionalism as an integrative theory 
in the process of European integration. Neofunctionalism will be critically 
analyzed regarding the margin and possibilities of its practical 
implementation in the integration process; furthermore, it shall be 
established how recent economic developments have been affecting the 
debate on integration at European level. It should be stressed that, due to 
its practical implementation at EU level, neofunctionalism is not merely a 
theoretical approach, but a phenomenon whose short term outcomes in real 
politics can be analyzed evaluating the actual situation of integrative 
processes. The main objective of this short analysis will be to determine the 
reciprocate influences of neofunctionalist theory and affiliated institutions 
within the integration process towards each other. 
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Basic terms and theories 
 
The term “integration” has been defined by Haas as a process “that 
pushes political actors of different national background and approaches to 
refocus their loyalties, expectations and political activities towards a new 
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center or rally point whose institutions are supreme to national states”.1 
Nevertheless, the historical context from which the concept of integrative 
theories did emerge should be taken into consideration. It is quite true that 
even before the European Integration Process materialized, there existed in 
international politics distinct concepts aimed at easing international 
rapprochement trough cooperation and common institutions. The most 
remarkable institution, capable of being defined as an international 
organization was the League of Nations – an ideal promoted and 
encouraged by US president Woodrow Wilson. According to von Arnauld, 
the League of Nations was the first attempt to establish a system of 
collective security within a supra-national body.2 Wilson was a famous 
supporter of the idealist school of international relations (IR), a theory 
advocating international cooperation in order to prevent the fatal 
development of conflicts of interest between states into warfare via the 
integration and entanglement of actors to each other. War as an acceptable 
action to reach political gains as continuity of politics with other means à la 
Clausewitz should not become just unattractive and unacceptable, but 
simply an unprofitable solution, as cooperation between international actors 
should be rewarding for all parties involved.  
This approach has often been criticized as superficial, rather 
theoretical and unrealistic, as states are supposed to act rationally and with 
                                                          
1 Thomas Diez, Antje Wiener, Introducing the Mosaic of Integration Theory, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 2. 
2 Andreas von Arnauld., Völkerrecht, Heidelberg, C. F. Müller, 2016, p. 55. 
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the aim of increasing their influence without any moral considerations. 
International relations theorists like Zimmern, who, still under the 
impression of the aftermath of the Great War, tried to work out solution 
models for a more peaceful and cooperative world, had been pledging not 
so much for the seemingly-utopian concept of a world society, but for an 
international system founded on ethical principles bound by international 
law and the will of all actors to work together in harmony. Zimmern deeply 
believed in the supremacy of international law and is also quoted as the 
most prominent scholar establishing international relations as a distinct 
research theory.3 While recognizing that power would be the primary 
source to enforce political interests in world politics, Zimmern still hoped 
that, with time, a level of certain moral consciousness would arise that 
would solidify the foundations of a future world society based on the 
common acceptance of international law between all actors.4   
After the failure of the League of Nations’ efforts to sustain peace 
and provide international stability, which had become obvious with the 
Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 and the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese 
War in 1936, idealistic views of international relations were more and more 
discredited. The Second World War with its devastating effects that also 
brought an end to a multi-polar international system naturally contributed to 
                                                          
3 Paul Rich, “Alfred Zimmern’s Cautious Idealism: The League of Nations, International 
Education, and the Commonwealth”, in: David Long, Peter Wilson (Eds.), Thinkers of the 
Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995, p. 
81.  
4 Alfred Zimmern, Internationale Politik als Wissenschaft, Berlin/Leipzig, Teubner , 1933, 
p. 15. 
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the fact that anything that represented idealist views in international 
relations was likely to be rejected as hopelessly outdated, mere theoretic 
and non-achievable in the “real world”. New patterns of thought, reflecting 
the reality of a bi-polar world divided into ideological camps, emerged with 
the rise of realism as a theory that seemed to adequately describe the 
situation of the upcoming Cold War. In a divided world in a state of 
anarchy, the quest for power and security becomes the focus of attention. 
Strength and deterrence are defined as the sole tools capable to prevent 
conflicts, even if the de-facto, or potential, state of war is seen as the natural 
state of relations between actors and peace is more or less a transitional 
period. Nevertheless, even during that pessimistic state of mind in the early 
Cold War, theorists such as Herz rejected models solely based on the 
principle of might, power and deterrence. Herz demanded a “realist 
idealism” as a solution for the security dilemma, in which he insisted on the 
highest possible cooperation level between states as single panacea against 
the renewed scourge of a global and all destroying war.5 Herz’ assumptions 
are not based on utopian models of harmony but the realistic assumption of 
achieving the highest possible common level of understanding between the 
actors. Using this method, he was hoping to present a model to establish a 
sustainable “balance of power” between the leading contemporary actors in 
world policy (USA and USSR) that might contribute towards diminishing 
conflict potential. 
                                                          
5 John Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”, in: World Politics, vol. 
2, no. 2, 1950, p. 179. 
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The integrative process that is encouraged trough neofunctionalism 
develops its own dynamics that do not only aim towards strengthening 
international cooperation, but also fostering and promoting stability on the 
international level. As the first grand scale IR theory, realism somehow 
seemed to promote the clash of ideologies and enforced polarization during 
the heydays of the Cold War. Nevertheless, parallel and alternative readings 
did emerge during the same period and helped developing IR theories on a 
broader scale. For instance, David Mitrany, one of the masterminds of 
functionalist theory, cannot be omitted in any study on the subject. In the 
summer of 1943, when the world was still rocked by World War II raging 
on the battlefields stretching from the Caucasus to the Pacific Ocean, 
Mitrany was elaborating the reasons why the League of Nations had failed 
as an international institution which, in theory, should have prevented 
armed conflicts. Mitrany concluded that only if governments were bound by 
clearly defined, internationally-accepted, binding and enforceable legal 
norms and rules, it would be possible to prevent war being used as a 
political tool. Furthermore, Mitrany stated that only administrative entities, 
in other words solid institutions, would be able to function as effective 
control instances able to enforce those norms.6 Within international law, 
this concept has been developed and institutionalized in form of the United 
Nations. While the UN is not a panacea against conflicts per-se, its function 
as an international body within international law and the principle of the 
prohibition of the use of force as enshrined within article 2 (4) of the UN 
                                                          
6 David Mitrany, A Working Peace System, Chicago, Quadrangle Books, 1966, p. 55. 
Mehmet Yilmazata  RJHIS 5 (1) 2018 
 
 
12 
 
Charter should be seen as a distinct milestone in the history of international 
law and the theory of international relations.7 
According to Mitrany, centrally-managed functional processes are 
of significant importance to solving any given problems: he cites President 
Roosevelt's “New Deal” economic recovery program of the 1930s as a 
successful model featuring centralized functions and processes. Mitrany 
rejects federalism as an integrative model citing historical failures, branding 
federalist approaches as too fragmented and dominated by particular 
interests that would hinder successful integration. Besides, Mitrany does not 
only rely on international bodies as means of conflict resolution, but does 
criticize the concept of borders as enforced by the classical national state. 
Instead, Mitrany focused on cross-border cooperation that would develop 
out of common interests, hoping for military conflicts to become obsolete 
within that system.8 Mitrany's central thesis is that every function within 
that system will be generating another function and creating a dynamic 
process which is dubbed “functionalism”.  One of the greatest proponents 
of functionalism, Jean Monnet, hoped that the forces of divisive nationalism 
could be checked by the common benefit gained through economic 
integration.9  
                                                          
7 Malcolm L. Shaw, International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 
469. 
8 Michael Haas, Polity and Society: Philosophical Underpinnings of Social Science 
Paradigms, Westport/CT, Praeger, 1992, p. 219. 
9 Karen A. Mingst, Ivan M. Arreguin-Toft, Essentials of International Relations, London 
& New York, W. W. Norton & Co, 2011, p. 202.  
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This thesis has been rethought and further developed under different 
auspices by proponents of the neofunctionalist school, who thought all 
institutions to be a decisive factor to stimulate more functional processes 
and proposed putting the focus of research on those models. It should not be 
forgotten that closer European integration under the auspices of the post-
war European Economic Community had been carved out under the shadow 
of the Cold War reality. As an exclusive community of – at the time – 
Western European States with a liberal political and economic system 
founded on the principles of constitutionalism and free market economy, 
the EEC was a counter-model against the communist states of Eastern 
Europe, which were dominated by planned economy and single party rule. 
Nevertheless, besides all political motives, the creation of a functional 
integration paradigm in theory and reality was an indispensable prerequisite 
for the emergence of a model to coordinate the cooperation between the 
communities of states on a supranational level.10 
 
Neofunctionalism and European integration: a self-explaining process? 
 
Since the beginning of the European integration process, one of the 
main obstacles was the unresolved role of the nation state as an actor. It 
might be possible to define the respective roles of member states or 
European institutions according to their gains from the common system. 
                                                          
10 Paul Magnette, Calypso Nicolaidis, “The European Union’s Democratic Agenda”, in: 
Mario Telo (ed.), The European Union and Global Governance, London, Routledge, 2009, 
p. 44. 
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The question might be whether institutions are in fact acting like 
individuals; nevertheless we should be aware that institutions – state or 
supranational – are still made up of human actors with their very own 
agenda.  
As assumed by one of the “fathers” of the liberal economic model, 
Adam Smith, individuals act out of self-interest and benevolence for 
themselves, thus creating favourable conditions for society as a whole.11 
Smith’s concept, which fits into the neofunctionalist theory only up to a 
certain point, should not be evaluated as based on mere personal self-
interest or even greed. According to Malloy, Smith saw economic self-
interest based on fairness, mutual respect and the wish to participate in the 
development of one’s community in a broader way.12 The strong state as 
sole actor within the international system per se had been a traditional 
participant in political actions due to its unchallenged power. Supranational 
institutions, for their part, are also a construction by the state itself. Within 
that philosophy, supranational institutions did function only as the 
respective states “aide de camps” and the actions of states were determined 
by short-term political interests. We should add that the liberal attitude 
displayed by Smith regarded authority not so much from the state’s 
perspective, but within the broader context of community. Authority and 
utility were given factors that did not require functional explanations of 
                                                          
11Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, New York, Cosimo Books, 2007, p. 20. 
12 Robin P. Malloy, “Adam Smith and  the Modern Discourse  of Law and Economics”, in: 
Robin P. Malloy, Jerry Evensky (eds.), Adam Smith and the Philosophy of Law and 
Economics, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994, p. 116.  
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bargaining and inclusion.13 This does point out that, within IR theories, 
while functionalism, as well as neofunctionalism, incorporate certain liberal 
patterns, the definition of liberalist principles is different than in economic 
theory. Specifically, in IR theories, institutions as states or other examples 
of authority are treated as active, positive decision-makers. In contrast to 
the classical definition of liberalism in economics, those actors may actively 
contribute towards the integration process.   
According to the liberal viewpoint of IR theories, the system is not 
only a structure but a process and all actors within the process develop their 
policy through learning and interaction.14 According to functionalism (and 
neofunctionalism), the state’s power should be limited; it may be said that 
the role of the state is transferred to supranational institutions. A pertinent 
question would be whether functionalism is just trying to supplant 
supranational institutions in lieu of the state. Following the liberal thought 
in economic theory, society as a whole is expected to take the lead; 
nevertheless, this is unlikely given the directive nature of neofunctionalism. 
Gramsci’s model of “civic society”, embracing economic, spiritual and 
intellectual concepts, best represented through the interaction of lobbying 
NGOs and EU bureaucracy, does not seem to represent a realistic 
alternative to the national state. This leads to the conclusion that 
neofunctionalism de facto aims to transfer state powers to the aforesaid 
                                                          
13 Ibidem, p. 115. 
14 Karen A. Mingst, Ivan M. Arreguin-Toft, op. cit., p. 102. 
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institutions: one power system is replaced by another with changing 
actors.15    
It should be specified that states, if defined as actors, seem to profit 
from a transformation of certain powers to supranational institutions. The 
level of freedom of action and sovereignty, which the involved states would 
have to transfer to the institutions in order to profit without giving up their 
character, has yet to be determined. Furthermore, Delhousse stresses that 
such a transformation process has to be made acceptable and attractive for 
national governments.16 Instead of a slowly developing political bargaining 
process in which the involved states are engaged, a more practical strategy 
has to be carved out. Neofunctionalism assumes that economic co-operation 
between states and non-state actors will automatically create the wish for 
greater integration. As the state is not expected to be able to foster this 
process, new institutions, bureaucratic in nature, are expected to steer the 
economic process of integration. Moreover, it is assumed that these 
institutions will be fully impartial, not obstructed by inter-state conflicts and 
clashes of interest.  
If we analyze that assumption, we are able to see that 
neofunctionalism does build its model on clearly liberal postulates without 
being willing to employ the principle of laissez-fair capitalism. In a 
paradoxical way, states are classified in the same way as individual actors; 
                                                          
15 Sabine Saurugger, Theoretical Approaches to European Integration, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2014, p. 37. 
16 Reanaud Dehousse, “From Community to Union”, in: Reanaud Dehousse (ed.), Europe 
after Maastricht. An Ever Closer Union?, München, C. H. Beck, 1994, p. 14.  
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both are expected to act according to their best interests. In the same way as 
Adam Smith who coined the acronym “invisible hand” – allocating 
resources due to aggregate demand – neofunctionalism does expect actors – 
both state and non-state – to fulfill the same function. But this process is 
meant to be fostered by “all-knowing” institutions. In a sharp contrast to 
liberal economic thought, this is a strange reference to the model of planned 
economy.  
Moreover, neofunctionalism postulates that the need for institutional 
change will be taken over by spillover processes, yet another adaption from 
the field of economics. Per definition, spillover effects are also known as 
“externalities”, usually generated in the distribution of public goods, 
whereas consumers that are not directly involved into market transactions 
are profiting from the external effects. Nevertheless, those effects may 
create positive or negative outcomes.17 A popular example for spillover 
effects is the role scientific research and technical improvements create in 
the production process. Usually with those factors, goods become more 
diversified, and the production process becomes cheaper, which has a 
positive impact for consumers. On the other hand, a negative spillover 
effect might be the loss of jobs due to automation and rationalization. We 
should mention, though, that economists deem those effects not negative in 
the long term. Schumpeter calls this process “positive destruction”, as new 
fields of employment are to be created that are more productive and avant-
                                                          
17 Richard George Lipsey, Colin Desmond Harbury, First Principles of Economics, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 23. 
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garde.18 To cite a contemporary example, the US Federal Reserve’s or the 
European Central Bank’s policy of providing liquidity to constrained 
markets does create spillover effects, as the world economy as a whole is 
affected. In a short time frame, providing liquidity leads to lower interbank 
and credit gains, providing potential investors with capital and creating trust 
in the markets. On the long term, however, excessive capital – if the 
markets are not able to allocate that capital into investment – might create 
negative inflationary effects.  
Nevertheless, different schools in economics (classics / neoclassics, 
Keynesians, monetarists) provide different viewpoints regarding that 
question. Neofunctionalists apply Schumpeter’s approach of creative 
destruction in the field of integration theory. Traditional structures that are 
not effective anymore are expected to be replaced with better ones. Within 
that context, possible economic advantages would induce the market 
participants to put pressure on their respective governments to strengthen 
international co-operation.19 The loyalty of market participants will thus be 
shaped no longer by their national background and national prejudices 
would shrink in favor of potential gains made possible by international 
trade. Classical economists as Smith or Ricardo focus on the principle of 
value, gross value and the effective distribution of scarce resources, utilities 
                                                          
18 Joseph. A. Schumpeter, Kapitalismus, Sozialismus und Demokratie, Stuttgart, UTB, 
2005, p. 137. 
19 Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2000, p. 51. 
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and goods.20 Classical economic theory also regards prices, wages and labor 
as fully flexible factors which function as circulations of input and output. 
At the end of the day, the market is expected to regulate itself. The 
assumption that economic integration would accelerate the political 
integration process was most certainly based on the development of 
economic history and the theory of the liberalism as well as “classical” 
economic theories per se. Nevertheless, neofunctionalism does not believe 
in the ability of the markets to perfectly distribute goods in the field of 
economics, as well as politics. Neofunctionalists do prefer the interference 
of a wiser actor than the market or, so to speak, do shun populist 
interventions. As the classical nation state is, according to their principles, 
not competent enough, institutions guided by good-willed individuals are 
supposed to take the lead. Within that scope, European history in the 20th 
century did play a role in forming that opinion. 
It had become obvious that the mere rising volume of the exchange 
of commercial goods alone was not sufficient to guarantee political 
stability. According to Hobsbawm, around the year 1914, world trade had 
reached a gigantic level as never seen before. Notwithstanding, 
protectionism and the promotion of national industries had created an 
international climate which, combined with economic rivalry, led to the 
collapse of the balance-of-power multipolar system and, finally, to the 
nemesis of the Great War.21 Combined with the hubris of World War II and 
                                                          
20 Thomas Sowell, On Classical Economics, New Haven/CT, Yale University Press, 2006, 
p. 97. 
21 Eric J. Hobsbawm, Das imperiale Zeitalter, München, DTV, 1995, p. 57. 
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the emergence of the Cold War, alternative models of thought to guarantee 
stability and peace that seemed more “realizable” were discussed by 
academicians and bureaucrats.22 The very trauma of two World Wars made 
political actors realize that only a close cooperation between European 
states could guarantee peace, prosperity and stability. As neofunctionalism 
focuses more on the practical side of integration than on empiric theory, it 
is often dubbed a “real life approach”, building less on the good will of 
participants than on specific obligations created by the aforementioned 
spillover effects. Rosamond mentions that bureaucratic institutions just 
have to create appropriate conditions for participants to enhance their level 
of co-operation even further.23  
The European Economic Community's development really seemed 
to work along those lines: supranational market interests first led to a 
lowering of tariffs between the member states which increased the level of 
trade. Closer trade links created the need to regulate and deregulate the 
process of trade between the actors. As states employed the support of 
supranational European institutions, the very states that had created those 
institutions had to adapt their respective national legislation according to 
the structure and working process of those institutions which had created 
the trade surpluses. The next step was the creation of more stable and 
sustainable exchange rates between the member states, creating more 
                                                          
22 John H. Fraser, The Iron Curtain. Churchill, America and the Origins of the Cold War, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 74. 
23 Ben Rosamond, op. cit., p. 52. 
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reliable markets and better possibilities for national economies to specialize 
in certain goods: the closer cooperation of financial institutions would 
finally lead to the creation of a European Central Bank and, after the 
customs union, of a common European currency. Nevertheless, the main 
function of the newly-created institutions lay not so much in taking a 
leading role, but in creating an environment which favored the smooth 
functioning of free markets.24  
 
Neofunctionalism in theory and practice 
 
According to Haas, the “grand seigneur” of neofunctionalism, 
integration has to be ensured via “supranational decision processes” which 
contribute through “institutionalized instances” to the bundling of common 
interests. Through the accomplished institutionalization, it is assumed that 
spillover processes will be created. Those incorporating mechanisms are 
supposed to foster closer cooperation that will lead to auto-dynamic 
processes further strengthening international cooperation.25 
Neofunctionalism itself enjoys a high level of popularity within the relevant 
literature, a situation that according to Diez / Werner is based on the fact 
                                                          
24 Stephen George, Ian Bache, Politics in the European Union, Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2001, p. 325. 
25 Ernst E. Haas, “International Integration: The European and the Universal Process”, in: 
International Organisation, vol. 15, no. 3, 1961, p. 368. 
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that “neofunctionalism” is more or less seen as the “official ideology” 
among wide parts of the EU bureaucracy.26  
The primary aim of neofunctionalism is, in the long term, the 
creation of a federal entity. Nevertheless, the levels and final shape of a 
clear and outspoken definition of Europe's future as a federal state differ 
widely between politicians of different nations. It is assumed that national 
governments just do not possess the capacities needed to create institutional 
cooperation on the highest levels. This fact contributes to the attractiveness 
of creating independent institutions and being able to act independently 
under the supervision of European bureaucrats.27 Contemporary 
theoreticians such as Moravczik do recognize neofunctionalism as a simple 
integration model which is not to be developed further as the future of the 
EU and the final goal of the process of integration is not yet defined clearly. 
It is not yet fully understood whether the integration process will really lead 
to a federal entity worth bearing the name “United States of Europe”, 
especially considering challenges such as the prospective exit of the United 
Kingdom from the EU and isolationist tendencies in foreign and economic 
policy.  
Given all that criticism, it should not be ignored that, as already 
suggested, a process of integration does not necessarily have to take place 
                                                          
26 Thomas Diez, Antje Wiener, op. cit., p. 14. 
27 Ralph Rotte, “Zur Didaktik politikwissenschaftlicher Theorien der eutopäischen 
Integration“, Zeitschrift für Hochschuldidaktik (ZFHD), no. 5, 2005, available at 
https://www.zfhe.at/index.php/zfhe/article/view/169/298,  accessed on 1st November 2018, 
p. 66. 
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only at European level, but is expandable to larger international fields on a 
global level, whereby it is hard to define the institutionalized final points 
and aims of such developments.28 As a matter of fact, spillover effects in 
legal issues are promoting economic harmonization especially regarding the 
labor market.29 According to Höreth, the neofunctionalist approach is 
particularly influential in the field of law, since the judges of the European 
Court, due to their institutional independence from national states, are able 
to distinguish between legal reality and political preferences. While certain 
interest groups promote the process of integration, supranational institutions 
(as the European Commission) are able to show support and take practical 
advantage from each other’s existence. Alliances between the different 
groups of interests may in the long run further accelerate integration. Those 
alliances reflect political and economic trends within European institutions. 
National governments, interest and lobby groups or European institutions 
might try to “externalize” issues (i.e. environmental issues) that were not 
solved at national level, trying to enforce those issues through the EU. 
Höreth further stresses that the European Court as a supranational 
institution actually has the power to establish contacts with subnational 
participants on every level, proving that jurisdiction already promotes an 
important process of integration driven by the will to homogenize European 
                                                          
28 Ralph Rotte, op. cit., p. 62. 
29 Markus Höreth, Stille Revolution im Namen des Rechts? Zur Rolle des Europäischen 
Gerichtshofs (EuGh) im Prozess der Europäischen Integration, Discussion Paper, Zentrum 
für Europäische Integrationsforschung, Bonn, 2000, available at 
http://www.zei.de/download/zei_dp/dp_c78_hoereth.pdf, accessed on 30th July 2018, p. 27. 
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law.30 Participants such as trade unions, federations and / or corporations / 
companies do possess the right to examine the compatibility of their 
respective national jurisdictions with European law by legal authorities. 
This has led companies to enforce their interests directly at the European 
Court of Justice rather than relying just on national jurisdiction.   
Successful integration can easily be documented on the basis of 
implementation into “real life”, this being a remarkable and distinguishing 
characteristic of neofunctionalism in relation to other IR theories. While for 
example „the real-world potential “of theories such as realism could only be 
evaluated after the end of the Cold War, the success of institutionalized 
integrationist processes may be determined on the basis of its practical 
effects regarding the economy and / or the political agenda. Perhaps one of 
the most important aspects of recent interpretations of neofunctionalism is a 
new approach related to the analysis of political processes. While 
traditionally political science consisted of the analysis of preset political 
variables” (i.e. constitutional aspects), neofunctionalist scholars have started 
to research patterns of political behaviour.31 As those patterns are easily 
depictable in numerical terms, i.e. through the statistical analysis of data 
(questionnaires, opinion polls etc.), the success potential of neofunctionalist 
policies seems to be determinable beforehand – an attractive choice for 
potential political actors. 
                                                          
30 Markus Höreth, op. cit., p. 29. 
31 Ben Rosamond, op. cit., p. 52. 
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The comprehensive view of an idealized, enlightened and 
accountable  “World State”,  as promoted by early representatives of 
functionalism has been given up in favor of concentrating on regional (in 
particular European) integration processes. However, the ideal of a compact 
“political unit” has been preserved in a more limited form.32 Given that fact, 
neofunctionalism is definitely not just a slightly modified version of 
functionalism, but has to be regarded as a fully independent and equal IR 
theory. A frequently criticized aspect of neofunctionalism is the premise of 
a political elite (bureaucrats, judges etc.) remaining the most important 
decision-makers, keeping watch over the structure of all relevant 
institutions. Criticism regarding the existence of a de facto elite in 
neofunctionalist theory as substantial decision-makers is certainly not 
totally unjustified. It should not be omitted that neofunctionalism might be 
an easy and comfortable justification for an all-powerful bureaucracy. From 
a historian’s perspective, that point of view is understandable: the all-
logical interpretation of events and integrationist processes by 
neofunctionalist scholars is a clear expression of a deeply deterministic and 
positive understanding of history in Hegelian tradition.33 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of neofunctionalism in relation to 
its practical implementation is the approach that policy is not to be rated as 
an interest-centered phenomenon, but that the political process is actually 
                                                          
32 Dimitris N. Chryssochoou, Theorizing European Integration, London, Sage, 2001, p. 40. 
33 Siegmar Schmidt, Wolf J. Schünemann, Europäische Union. Eine Einführung, Baden-
Baden, Nomos, 2009, p. 12. 
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already being treated as part of the solution of a problem.34 It should be 
pointed out that neofunctionalism with all its variations is purely an 
integrationist theory and does not claim to be an all-comprehensive IR 
theoretic approach. For that reason, neofunctionalism does have a less 
important role in foreign and security policy. 35 
 
Neofunctionalism: a critical outlook 
 
Critically, it has to be stressed that current restrictions towards new 
EU member states in Eastern Europe (i.e. regarding the freedom of job 
markets) or culturally-uttered sentiments against potential EU membership 
candidate states as Serbia or Turkey are in no way compatible with the 
liberal character of the EU, as well as neofunctionalist thoughts. Similarly, 
recent sentiments against EU member states struggling to regain financial 
stability (i.e. Greece) also might enforce the fear of a two-class Europe with 
strong “core members” and “peripheral states” as addendum.36 
                                                          
34 Armin Schäfer, Vier Perspektiven zur Entstehung und Entwicklung der Europäischen 
Beschäftigungspolitik, Discussion Paper, Köln, 2002, available at http://www.mpi-fg-
koeln.mpg.de/pu/mpifg_dp/dp02-9.pdf, accessed on 30th July 2018, p. 6. 
35 Gunter Hellman, Wolfgang Wagner, ”Zivile Weltmacht? Die Außen-Sicherheits- und 
Verteidigungspolitik der Europäischen Union“, in: Marku Jachtenfuchs, Beate Kohler-
Koch (eds.), Europäische Integration, Opladen, Leske + Budrich, 2003, available at 
www.soz.uni-frankfurt.de/ hellmann/mat/GASP-Endfassung2.pdf, accessed on 30th July 
2018, p. 574. 
36 Gilbert Ziebura, “Europa zwischen globaler Angliederung und regionaler Identität“, in: 
Ingeborg Tömmel (ed.), Europäische Integration als Prozess von Angleichung und 
Differenzierung, Opladen, Leske+ Budrich, 2001, p. 31. 
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Despite that unpleasant background, neofunctionalism has – in the 
case of European integration – proven to be the most successful theoretical 
model in IR integration theory. The European model might show that the 
cornerstone for political integration is successful economic integration. In 
order to achieve that outcome, economic, as well as political, players must 
be willing to change their organizational structure significantly in order to 
enable a supranational system. It is difficult to establish loyalties bound to 
abstract and impersonal-seeming ideas, explaining a certain reluctance of 
great parts of society towards the concept of integration. Neofunctionalist 
scholars defend themselves stating that only small steps will lead to a 
sustainable and satisfying result, warning against short-term expectations 
set too high. 
Regarding the example of the EU, a lot of criticism is directed 
towards neofunctionalism with its market-orientated approach that has 
created an entity not bound by common moral values but a “soulless giant.” 
37 Nevertheless, the much criticized EU also is able to present certain 
successes in its structure: despite the ongoing constitutional debate, EU 
institutions have been reformed significantly, commissary posts are rotating 
and member states do possess a greater level of participation than ever 
before. Evaluating the neofunctionalist model of thought also means 
realizing that the growing number of actors in an integrative system simply 
makes it impossible to harmonize all particular interests. Moreover, 
supranational institutions are in no way immune against high-jacking 
                                                          
37 Gilbert Ziebura, op. cit., p. 23. 
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attempts by powerful coalitions of interest groups, politicians or other 
actors, meaning that temporary coalitions are able to use supranational 
institutions against their intended functions. The only alternative, the 
strengthening and creation of an even bigger bureaucratic apparatus is 
neither an attractive model.   
Additionally, supranational institutions need to be able to lead and 
direct certain processes, a fact often associated with an undemocratic and 
patronizing stance. Proponents of neofunctionalism such as Moravczik, 
continue to present the EU as a success model for applied institutionalized 
policy that also shows the limits of “realpolitik”.38 It has to be stressed that, 
without a sufficient level of identification of citizens with integrationist 
processes, the success rate decreases dramatically, a fact most often omitted 
by integrationist theorists. While most authors don't express this as openly 
as Moravczik, it is a matter of fact that neofunctionalist approaches did play 
a decisive role for cooperation and integration processes in the past, but the 
expected results do not seem really satisfying anymore. That the transfer of 
powers to supranational institutions remains attractive enough for political 
players despite all the odds is explainable by the fact that a consensus for 
broad decision processes leaves more space for the involved parties on the 
supranational level compared with the national level.39  Likewise, 
                                                          
38Andrew Moravcsik, “Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach”, in: Simon Bulmer, Andrew Scott, (eds.), Economic and 
Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1994, p. 29. 
39 Ibidem, p. 63. 
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politicians can more easily act without the hindering influence of lobby 
groups on the national level, therefore being able to externalize national or 
local problems.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Haas’ thesis that neofunctionalism with its “spillover processes” will 
automatically transform economical processes into a politico-economic 
continuum towards a political union has been discussed and widely 
criticized. As long as political processes are dependent on freely acting 
interest groups, a fully-fledged automatism will hardly emerge. Criticism 
appears to be justified to a certain extent, as within the institutions of the 
European Union frequent personnel changes do appear, often leading to 
changes in substantial political questions, despite the balancing factor of a 
well-established bureaucratic system. In conclusion, despite all criticism, 
neofunctionalism remains one of the few IR theories that is applied in daily 
political processes and still leads to measurable successes in terms of 
integration. In the long term, neofunctionalism should be evaluated as a 
theory that, within its own set of preconditions, explains itself best in 
practical application. A close eye on the further development of the EU will 
provide the best outlook towards the applicability of neofunctionalism.  
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